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Abstract
The Composition of Probabilistic Preferences (CPP) is employed here to combine evaluations of a set of factors determined 
by adding human reliability criteria to the traditional FMEA criteria. The risks according to each of nine criteria are 
evaluated for ten failure modes by a set of seven evaluators. The probabilistic transformation of CPP employs a beta 
distribution, whose parameters are estimated on the basis of the means and modes of the samples of seven evaluation values. 
In the case studied, higher discrimination is provided by the use of the sample means.
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1. Introduction
Martins [1] developed CPP-Hi as a tool to add psychological factors affecting human performance to the 
classical technical factors of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the evaluation of risks in highly 
complex environments. Starting from the identification of potential failure modes, CPP-Hi is based on the 
assessment of risks in accordance with an expanded collection of criteria.
CPP-Hi [1] considers, besides the classical FMEA [2] factors of severity, occurrence and detectability, 
factors on two human reliability dimensions. These new dimensions are determined in terms of the 
intelligibility and the stress of the situation that may provoke human errors.
After evaluations according to all the criteria are obtained, Composition of Probabilistic Preferences (CPP) 
[3] is employed to combine the criteria, generating for each failure mode a classification and a risk priority 
probability (RPP) [4]. Sensitivity analyses conclude the application of the tool.
This approach is here applied to the analysis of the event of loss of off-site power in a nuclear power plant. 
Ten failure modes are selected and evaluated by a set of seven experts regarding each of nine criteria.
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CPP starts with the transformation of the evaluations received by the failure modes into probabilities of 
preference [3]. This probabilistic transformation employs here beta distributions, with different parameters for 
each evaluation. A comparison was performed between the results of employing the means and the modes of 
the samples of the seven evaluations in the estimation of such parameters. It was observed higher 
discriminative power when the sample means are employed.
2. Human Reliability and FMEA
The first documentation of FMEA appeared in [2]. [5], [6] and others highlight the method application in the 
aerospace industry in the 60s. In the 70s, the tool began to be discussed more widely and, in 1978, the Ford 
Company inserted FMEA in its quality assurance concept [7]. After that, in the 80s, the auto companies that 
form the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) formally incorporated the tool in their product 
development processes, by means of QS-9000 [8]. Following this movement, the German industry adopted the 
use of the tool as defined by the Verband der Automobilindustrie - German Association of the Automotive 
Industry (VDA).
FMEA starts with the identification of functions and requirements of a system, subsystem, component or 
step in a process. Following are determined effects and causes of failure modes [6]. The next step is the 
judgment by a multidisciplinary team that assigns values to the severity of the effects (S), and the occurrence 
probabilities (O) of the causes [9]. Later, values are assigned to the difficulty of detection (D). It is then 
computed the product of the values of S, O and D. This product score is called Risk Priority Number (RPN).
The evaluation team is expected to propose also actions to eliminate or detect failure modes with the highest
RPN, controlling their causes or mitigating their effects [10].
FMEA was initially used with 11 levels ranging from 1 to 10 ([2], [11]). Along time, scales of five levels 
became more used. More information on the scales of five levels or studies with similar scales can be found in 
[12] and [13].
The methodology developed in [1], CPP-Hi, adds to FMEA the evaluation of human reliability factors. A
classic definition of human reliability is due to Meister [14] that defines the term as the probability that a job or 
task be completed successfully by employees in any system operation phase within a minimum time 
requirement. 
CPP-Hi modifies FMEA by adding the focus on the investigation of possible human error. Human failures 
are the result of mental processes, such as forgetfulness, inattention, low level of motivation, carelessness, 
negligence and recklessness [15]. To consider these mental processes, in CPP-Hi, the stress of the operator on 
the situation addressed and the difficulty in its intelligence are considered in addition to the traditional factors 
of FMEA.
In the intelligibility dimension, evaluations according to two factors are taken: complexity and time to a 
diagnosis. In the stress dimension, two other factors are considered: workload and duration. On the severity 
dimension, impacts on people, facilities and the environment are separately evaluated.
Severity and unintelligibility scales are built with five increasing levels: very low, low, moderate, high and 
very high. These levels are associated with values from one to five. Occurrence scales follow the same pattern, 
increasing from 1 to 5, with the occurrence evaluated in terms of very unlikely, unlikely, occasional, likely and 
very likely. Undetectability increases also from 1 to 5, with detection evaluated as very easy, easy, moderate, 
difficult and very difficult.
On the other hand, the scale for the stress factor considers also five levels: low, ideal, moderate, high and 
threatening, but in this case is not used an increasing scale. An inversion in the ratings of the lowest levels of 
stress is applied. This inversion is built to take into account that an environment with a low workload and a 
comfortable runtime is not the least critical scenario, since in excessively favorable circumstances idle 
operators may become inattentive.
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3. CPP
CPP [3] is a methodology for multiple criteria composition that takes into account the imprecision in the 
measurements. The initial measurement is used as an estimate for a location parameter such as the mean, the 
median or the mode of a probability distribution. The basic idea is that such initial assessment is a realization of 
a random variable and if other measurements were taken values around it would be observed.
For each criterion, an individual evaluation of each alternative is then given by the probability of such 
alternative being the best or the worst. The calculation of such probabilities involves comparison to all the other 
alternatives.
As the preferences according to each criterion are assessed by probabilities, the final scores can be 
obtained by computing joint probabilities. For instance, a ranking by the joint probability of being the preferred 
option by all the criteria together may be used. This joint probability is calculated, assuming independence, 
simply multiplying the probabilities of preference according to each criterion.
The probability of the alternative being preferred according to at least one of the criteria may be also 
employed. Or the probability of not being the least preferred according to any criterion. And so on. If the 
hypothesis of independence between the evaluations according to different criteria is assumed, each of these 
joint probabilities can be calculated by performing only multiplication and subtraction operations.
The possibility of dependence between the evaluations according to different criteria was also studied [16].
The use in a simple calculation of all the values registered is a practical reason to adopt the independence 
assumption as a starting point and take other hypotheses only if there are special reasons to consider strong 
dependence cases.
The use of CPP to generate risk priority probabilities (RPP) instead of the RPN of FMEA was proposed in 
[4]. The RPP of a failure mode is given by the probability of the intersection of the events of it being the failure 
mode with the highest risk according to all the criteria. The hypothesis of independence leads to calculate the 
RPP by the product of the scores according to each factor, in the same way as RPN is calculated. The 
difference is in the transformation of the vector of initial scores according to each factor into a vector of 
probabilities of each failure mode being that with the highest risk according to the factor.
This probabilistic transformation leads to give more emphasis to the risks with higher initial assessments. 
For example, a change from 1 to 2 in the score for severity results in doubling the RPN, while a change from 4
to 5 results in a much smaller increase. On the other hand, if there are failure modes with high risk in the initial 
severity evaluation, failure modes with initial scores of 1 and 2 will be given small and consequently similar 
probabilities of being those of highest risk, while larger differences appear between the probabilities of failure 
modes with high initial scores being those with the highest probabilistic risk.
3.1. CPP-Tri
CPP-Tri [17] is a derivation from CPP focused on the allocation of the alternatives into pre-determined 
classes. Its entrance data are, besides a matrix whose rows are formed by the evaluations of each alternative 
according to each criterion, another matrix whose rows are formed by values according to the same criteria of
class representative profiles.
The representative profiles can be derived from the values observed in the evaluation of the alternatives. For 
example, profiles for each of five classes may be generated after ordering the values registered for each 
criterion. The representative profile for the lowest class will be formed by the values of the percentiles of 10%. 
Analogously the percentiles of 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% would provide representative profiles for each of the 
other four classes.
In the case of FMEA, as a previously informed scale drives the choice of the scores by the team of experts, it 
is convenient to use that same scale in the construction of profiles. For instance, if the evaluations are to be
given in a scale from 1 to 5, five classes with representative profiles with constant values of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 will 
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be used.
Let us suppose that only one profile is used to represent each class and let us denote by Ask+ and Ask- the 
probabilities of alternative A (in the present case, a failure mode) presenting evaluations, regarding to the k-th 
criterion, respectively, above and below the predetermined value for the profile of the s-th class. Assuming 
independence between evaluations according to different criteria, the probability of an alternative presenting 
assessments below the profile of a class by all the criteria is the product of the probabilities relative to each 
criterion alone. The same works for the probabilities of presenting assessments above the profile. These joint 
probabilities are then given, respectively, by As+ = kAsk+ and As- = kAsk-
The absolute values of the differences As+ - As- are evaluated for each possible alternative. Alternative A is 
finally allocated in the class s with the lowest absolute value for As+ - As-.
More favorable and unfavorable classifications can be obtained by comparing the probabilities obtained 
assuming independence with those obtained assuming maximal dependence between the events of the
assessment being respectively above and below the class. Assuming maximal dependence, the probability of 
the intersection is given, instead of by the product, by the minimum of the values of the probabilities for each 
criterion, A0s+ = minkAsk+ and A0s- = minkAsk-. A higher classification is then obtained by comparing the 
absolute values of the differences A0s+ - As-. On the other hand, a lower classification is given by the value of s 
that minimizes the absolute value of the difference As+ - A0s-.
Interval classifications can be formed with bounds given by these most unfavorable and most favorable 
classifications.
3.2. CPP with multiple evaluators
A key stage in CPP and CPP-Tri is the transformation of each measurement of preference for an alternative 
according to a criterion into a random variable centered on the value of such measurement. The probability 
distribution of this random variable has such observed value as a location parameter and is completely 
determined by adding other parameters to model random disturbances.
For symmetric disturbances, a normal distribution can be assumed and the modeling is completed by setting 
a dispersion parameter. The triangular distribution may be used to allow for asymmetry. The observed values
will then inform the modes and the distributions will be fully determined by two more parameters: the 
maximum and minimum values allowed. In the case of an integer scale from 1 to 5, a natural way to introduce 
imprecision will be by means of a triangular distribution with extremes 0 and 6.
In the case of FMEA, due to the fact that the experts record their ratings on a fixed scale, modeling the 
disturbances as asymmetric can better reflect the reality of the evaluation process, with high measurements 
more probably coming from positive disturbances and low measurements from negative disturbances. Thus, if a
risk factor is evaluated, for instance, at level 2, it is represented by a triangular distribution with mode equal to 
2, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 6.
When the scores according to each criterion are obtained from evaluations by several experts, the sets of 
measurements for the same alternative may be treated as samples of the distribution of their random variable 
and may be used to estimate not only the location parameter, but also the other parameters that determine the 
distribution. If normality is assumed, the sample variance may be used to estimate the variance of the 
distribution.
In the asymmetric model, a natural extension of the triangular distribution is the beta distribution.
Beta distributions are determined by the density f (x) = [(x-L)/(U-L)]Į-1[(U-x)/(U-L)]ȕ-1/Beta(Į,ȕ), for x 
varying between L and U and Beta denoting the beta function.
This distribution is unimodal for Į>1 and ȕ>1, with mean given by L+m(U-L) for m=Į/(Į+ȕ) and mode 
given by L+M(U-L) for M=(Į-1)/(Į+ȕ-2).
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The variance decreases with the sum Į + ȕ. This gives the modeling with the beta distribution a handicap, as 
the number of experts employed in the evaluation may be used as an estimator of Į+ȕ. Given the extremes L 
and U, from the mode M and the number of experts N, estimates for the parameters Į and ȕ of the beta 
distribution are, simply, given by aM = [M-L)/(U-L)](N-2)+1 and bM = [(U-M)/(U-L)](N-2)+1.
For small samples, the information disregarded by the sampling mode may become relevant. In this case, 
instead of the mode, the mean may be used. Based on the mean m, Į and ȕ are estimated by am = [(m-L)/(U-
L)]N and bm = [(U-m)/(U-L)]N, respectively.
N must be greater than 3, and (M-L)/(U-L) should be between 1/(N-2) and (N-3)/(N-2) to justify the use of a
beta distribution. If this does not happen, the triangular distribution should still be used.
4. Example of Application
CPP-Hi is used here in a study of the situation of loss of external electric power in a nuclear plant. The 
triggering event can be caused by failures in the substation, problems in the external network or in the plant 
system. A wrong management of this situation may result in damage to the reactor core. Martins [1] built a
failure tree and identified ten main failure modes, here represented by M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9 
and M10.The ten failure modes were submitted to evaluation by seven experts who filled separate report sheets. 
4.1. Classification
CPP-Tri was applied to allocate each failure mode to one of five classes, each identified by a unique risk 
profile with a constant value for each criterion. To achieve this allocation, the probability of each failure mode 
receiving evaluations above and below the profile of each class in each criterion was computed.
Table 1 presents the final classes where the ten modes of failure were allocated, employing beta distributions 
with parameters derived from sample modes and sample means using the procedure described above and those
obtained in [1] by using the normal distribution.
Table 1. Classification of ten modes of failure
Modes of Failure by beta modes by beta means by normal
M1 4 3 3
M2 3 2 2
M3 4 3 3
M4 3 2 2
M5 4 3 3
M6 3 4 3
M7 4 4 4
M8 4 4 3
M9 3 3 3
M10 3 3 3
The results shown in Table 1 indicate the higher discriminating power obtained when the estimation is based 
on the sample means. The failure modes are then spread along three classes, while the classification based on 
the modes joints the modes of failure in only two classes. This was expected, given the use of more information 
in the determination of the mean value. Table 1 also shows a noticeable concordance between the 
classifications obtained employing the beta and the normal distribution.
867 Annibal Parracho Sant’Anna et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  55 ( 2015 )  862 – 869 
4.2. Risk Priority Probabilities
A comparison in terms of probabilities of presenting the highest probabilistic risk was also performed. Beta 
distributions with parameters derived from the sample means were employed to derive the RPP. Joint 
probabilities of maximizing the risk according to the nine criteria were computed by using the following 
procedure of R software [18] applied to entrance data given by the matrix of sample means stored in the file 
dadosfmea6.txt.
A <- as.matrix(read.table("dadosfmea6.txt")) 
N<-A;Alfa<-A;Beta<-A;ASAI<-A
for (j in 1:ncol(A))




for (j in 1:ncol(A))




for (i in 1:nrow (A))
{Score[i]<-prod(ASAI[i,])}
write.table(Score, file="scorebeta.txt")
Table 2 presents the probabilities of each mode of failure being that of highest risk according to each risk 
factor and, in the two last columns, the RPP and the ranks determined by them.
Table 2. Ranking by RPP
Modes of Failure P F E O D C TD W DT RPP Rank
M1 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.09 1.7E-10 5
M2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 4.7E-13 10
M3 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.02 1.1E-11 8
M4 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 5.8E-13 9
M5 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.09 2.2E-09 4
M6 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.06 0.26 3.5E-09 3
M7 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.21 1.7E-08 1
M8 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.21 9.1E-09 2
M9 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.02 1.7E-11 7
M10 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.04 6.7E-11 6
In practical terms, the results in Table 2 coincide again with those of the analysis in [1]. There is also strong 
agreement with the results of the application of CPP-Tri. 
In fact, the modes of failure 6, 7 and 8 are highlighted in the evaluation by CPP-Tri and by the RPP. Besides, 
M2 and M4 receive the worst ranks and are classified in the lowest classes.
These results are different from those obtained by applying classical FMEA, which would point M3, M5 and 
M10 as the failure modes of higher risk, while M6 would receive a low risk score. This may be partly explained 
by the fact that M6, M7 an M8 are most affected by the human reliability factors. But the extension of the rule 
of multiplying the modes of the numerical initial ratings will also lead to different results, with M5 classified as 
the mode with the highest risk of failure and M6 located in an intermediary position.
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5. Conclusion
The use of CPP in a process of amplification of the set of factors contemplated in the FMEA evaluation of 
risks allows for a more complete assessment of the failure modes. The allocation in classes previously defined
by reference profiles, as well as the ranking by probabilistic priorities derived from the probabilities of being 
the mode of failure of highest risk by each risk criterion, was shown to improve the evaluation of risks in the 
nuclear power sector. 
A new feature of the probabilistic approach here discussed is the modeling by beta distributions. This allows 
for more thoroughly exploring the information available in the case of availability of evaluations by multiple 
experts. 
An estimation methodology was described here based on the use of the sample mean or the sample mode 
and the number of experts employed. It allows for making the variance of the distribution vary from evaluation 
to evaluation according to both these factors. 
This approach was successfully employed here, conveying results consistent with those of previous studies 
on the risks of potential failure modes in the situation of external power loss in a nuclear plant.
The results obtained with the beta distribution were similar to those obtained previously with the normal 
distribution, contributing to demonstrate the robustness of the probabilistic approach.
The judgment by a group of experts was employed to rank and classify the risks of the failure modes. This 
brings an important contribution to the culture of safety and continuous improvement in reliability at a nuclear 
plant.
References
[1] Martins, EF., Instrumento híbrido aplicado ao estudo da confiabilidade humana em evento de perda de energia elétrica externa em usina 
nuclear. D. Sc Thesis UFFniversidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, 2014.
[2] US MILITARY, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, United States Military Procedure MIL-P-
1629, 1949. 
[3] Sant’Anna, AP, Sant’Anna, LAFP., Randomization as a Stage in Criteria Combining. In Ribeiro, J. L. D., Fogliato, F. S, Guimarães, L. 
B. M., editors. Production and Distribution Challenges for the 21th Century. Porto Alegre: ABEPRO, 2001, 248-256.
[4] Sant’Anna, AP., Probabilistic priority numbers for failure modes and effects analysis. International Journal of Quality & Reliability 
Management 2012; 29: 349-362.
[5] Pentti, H.; Atte, H., Failure mode and effects analysis of software-based automation systems. Helsinki: STUK - Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority, 2002.
[6] Bertsche, B., Reliability in Automotive and Mechanical Engineering: Determination of Component and System Reliability. Berlin: 
Springer, 2008.
[7] Clarke, C., Automotive Production Systems and Standardisation: From Ford to the Case of Mercedes-Benz. Heidelberg: Physica-
Verlag, 2005.
[8] Laurenti, R., Villari, BD, Rozenfeld, H., Problemas e melhorias do método FMEA: uma revisão sistemática da literatura. Pesquisa & 
Desenvolvimento Engenharia de Produção 2012; 10: 59-70.
[9] Liu, HC, Liu, L, Liu, N., Risk evaluation in failure mode and effects analysis: a literature review. Expert Systems with Applications,
2013; 40: 828-838.
[10] AIAG, Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) - Reference Manual, Southfield: Automotive Industry Action Group,
2008.
[11] US MILITARY, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, United States Military Procedure MIL-
P-1629a, 1980.
[12] BSI, BS5760: Reliability of Systems, Equipment and Components – Part 5. Guide to Failures Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMEA and FMECA), London: British Standards Institute, 1991.
[13] Ben-Daya, M., Raouf, A., A revised failure mode and effect model. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management 1993; 
13: 43-47.
[14] Meister, D., Human Factors in Reliability, Section 12 in W. G. Ireson, editor. Reliability Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
[15] Reason, J. Safety paradoxes and safety culture. Injury Control and Safety Promotion 2000; 7: 3-14.
869 Annibal Parracho Sant’Anna et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  55 ( 2015 )  862 – 869 
[16] Sant’Anna, AP, Ribeiro, RA., Statistical Modeling and Probabilistic Composition in the prediction of the customer lifetime 
value. Benchmarking: an International Journal 2009; 16, 335-350.
[17] Sant’Anna, AP, Detalhamento de uma Metodologia de Classificação baseda na Composição Probabilística de Preferências, RPEP,
2013, 13 ( 3): 12-21.
[18] R CORE TEAM, R: A language and environment for statistical computing. The R Foundation 2012, available at http://www.R-
project.org/.
